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Preliminary Injunction: What’s Your Function? 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. Natural Defense Council and the effect on 
this Extraordinary Remedy. 
 
Amanda Laird 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 “There is no power, the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater 
caution, deliberation and sound discretion, and which is more dangerous in a doubtful 
case, than the issuing of an injunction.”1  A preliminary injunction is often described as 
an extraordinary and potent remedy.
 2
  This remedy, however, is a common tool in federal 
litigation practice and regularly used in a variety of civil actions.
3
  Despite its 
extraordinary status and common presence in America’s judicial system, there is much 
disarray surrounding this procedural tool.   
The federal circuit courts are in disharmony on the substantive principles 
pertaining to a preliminary injunction.
4
  “There are variations among the various circuit 
courts of appeals as to the standard to be applied, how the elements of the standard are 
considered, the relative weight to be assigned to each element, and the inclination to grant 
relief beyond the maintenance of status quo.”5  While each circuit agrees that the 
preliminary injunction test rests on four factors, courts apply these four factors in various 
different ways.  The Supreme Court has yet to expressly resolve the variation of 
standards among the circuit courts. 
                                                 
1
 Citizens’ Coach Co. v. Camden Horse R.R. Co., 29 N.J. Eq. 299, 303 (1878). 
2
 Andrew Muscato, The Preliminary Injunction in Business Litigation, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 649 (2007). 
3
 Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV. 
LITIG. 495, 496. 
4
 Muscato, supra note 2 at 650 (“Somewhat surprisingly, the substantive and procedural principles 
pertaining to a preliminary injunction in federal court are not as clear or settled as commonly thought.”). 
5
 Id. at 650. 
 2 
Proponents of a uniform standard argue that different standards and different 
required levels of burdens serve an injustice to parties seeking preliminary injunctive 
relief.
6
  This injustice includes inequitable decisions and inconsistent applications of the 
standards.  Some proponents argue that the Supreme Court should articulate one standard 
which would enable seeking a preliminary injunction more efficient for both movants and 
the courts.
7
  The Supreme Court has yet to enforce one standard; however, the Court 
recently, in Winter v. Natural Defense Council, criticized the standard used by the Ninth 
Circuit. 
The Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s decision to grant a preliminary 
injunction restraining the United States Navy’s usage of MFA sonar during anti-
submarine warfare training.
8
  The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, 
stated that the Ninth Circuit’s standard for irreparable harm was too lenient.9  The Ninth 
Circuit required that the movant only show that irreparable harm was a possibility.
10
  The 
Court ultimately held the preliminary injunction had to be denied because irreparable 
harm should be likely and the movant did not satisfy this heightened burden.
11
 
The Supreme Court raised the threshold level a movant must meet in satisfying 
the burden of showing irreparable harm beyond that required by the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit.  The opinion also discusses applying all four factors equally; however, 
it does not expressly reject the sliding scale method of granting injunctive relief.
12
  This 
                                                 
6
 Denlow, supra note 3; see also Muscato, supra note 2. 
7
 Denlow, supra note 3. 
8
 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S.Ct. 365 (2008). 
9
 Id at 375.  
10
 Id. 
11
 Id.  
12
 Id at 392 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 3 
decision may have far reaching effects on lower federal courts’ standards for injunctive 
relief. 
This comment discusses the effect of the Winter decision on the preliminary 
injunction standard in the lower courts and how this decision may be one step closer to a 
uniform standard.  The Winter decision emphasizes the importance of injunctive relief by 
tightening the standard and increasing the burden on the movant to show that preliminary 
injunctive relief is a necessary remedy.  Recently, several lower courts, which had used 
different formulations of the test, have interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision as 
prescribing one standard.  The courts of appeals are bound by the decisions of the 
Supreme Court; the emergence of one standard for granting or denying a preliminary 
injunction is possible and the circuit courts will finally be in harmony over this 
extraordinary remedy. 
 
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.  
The preliminary injunction is “an equitable remedy derived from the principles of 
judicial remedies devised and administered by the English Court of Chancery at the time 
the United States divorced itself from England.”13  The main distinction between law and 
equity is the remedy each offers.  In courts of law, the most common remedy is monetary 
damages.  Courts of equity, however, enter injunctions which either prevent someone 
from acting or require someone to act.   
Equity developed during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in England into the 
“extraordinary justice administered by the King’s Chancellor to enlarge, supplant or 
                                                 
13
 Denlow, supra note 3 at 500 (quoting Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 
308, 318 (1999)). 
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override the common law system where that system had become too narrow and rigid in 
its scope.”14  Equity was to remain flexible and different from the common law system.  
However, the principles governing injunctions today developed primarily in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to forbid parties from doing some threatened act that 
would work irreparable harm to another party.
15
 
Equity’s primary focus was to provide relief where the result at law would be 
unjust and where the public interest would be benefited by either the enforcement or 
prevention of contracts.
16
  To prevent unjust results, “equity, fundamentally, [was and] is 
based upon the power of the court to do what ‘reason and conscience’ require in the 
particular case.”17  Every case that fell into the hands of the Chancery court was to be 
determined according to the discretion of the court.  There were no set ground rules for 
courts to follow and courts made decisions on a case-by-case basis. 
Once English equity practice arrived in the American Colonies, the American 
courts of equity commonly used the injunction as a preventative and protective tool, 
rather than a restorative tool in which to make a party whole again.
18
  Prior to the merger 
of law and equity, equity was viewed as a supplemental system of jurisprudence.
19
  When 
                                                 
14
 Muscato, supra note 2 at 653( quoting Goldwin Smith, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF 
ENGLAND 209 (1955)); see also Bradford E. Dempsey, Nancy L. Dempsey & Kirstin L. Stoll-DeBell, 
USING PRESUMPTIONS TO TIP THE BALANCE FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, 33 LIT. 15 (Fall, 2006) (“The 
chancellor, a high minister appointed by the king, exercised the king’s arbitrary power to ‘do justice’ in 
certain cases, including the power to grant injunctive relief. Vested with these equitable powers, the 
chancellor was a powerful figure who possessed vast discretion in applying equitable remedies. Often a 
bishop of the church, the chancellor frequently relied on appeals to conscience in determining whether to 
grant injunctive relief.”). 
15
 Id. at 654. 
16
 Walsh, supra note 15 at 42. 
17
 Id. at 43. 
18
 William F. Walsh, A TREATISE ON EQUITY, § 9 at 155 (1930). 
19
 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2942 (2d ed. 1995). 
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a legal remedy was inadequate, an equitable remedy was available.
20
  Thus, equity and 
law were distinct.  However, with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
law and equity merged.
21
 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the focus of the preliminary injunction 
standard was to maintain the status quo of the matter in dispute, pending a trial on the 
merits.
22
  The Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., held 
that the scope of federal equity jurisdiction should be “in accordance with such rules and 
principles as governed by the action of the Court of Chancery in England which 
administered equity at the time of the emigration of our ancestors and down to the 
Constitution.”23  Equity cases were governed by the rules of Equity promulgated by the 
Supreme Court in 1912.
24
  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective in 
1938, thus creating a union between law and equity.
25
   
Although merged, law and equity differ on many different aspects.  Equity 
prevents someone from acting, while law remedies an injured party through damages.  
Equity was derived from the Maxims of Equity and developed with no fixed rules of its 
own.
26
  The Lord Chancellor made decisions based according to his own conscience.
27
  
                                                 
20
 Denlow, supra note 3 at 501. 
21
 Dempsey, supra note 14. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 460, 462 (1855). 
24
 Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions: The Varying Standards, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV 173, 177 
(1984). 
25
 Id.  
26
 See Wright, supra note 21 at § 2942 (The maxims of equity are the traditional principles applied by the 
courts of equity.  Some include: “equity regards as done that which ought to be done,” “equity will not 
suffer a wrong to be without a remedy,” and “equity delights in equality.”). 
27
 Id. 
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However, equity began to lose a bit of its flexibility as the system became a law of 
precedent.
28
 
After 1938, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governed injunctive relief.
29
  This 
rule set forth certain procedural requirements to prevent abuse of the rule.  When Rule 65 
was formulated, it depended on traditional principles of equity and did not alter 
substantive prerequisites.
30
  Rule 65 did “not set out a comprehensive or detailed 
procedural framework for seeking injunctive relief.”31  Since the rule does not set forth a 
detailed procedural framework, the court is left to the principles of equity when granting 
or denying injunctive relief. 
 
III. THE ROLE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN TODAY’S FEDERAL COURTS 
 Today, courts frequently issue preliminary injunctions to protect the plaintiff from 
irreparable injuries and to ensure that courts may provide meaningful relief after a trial on 
the merits.
32
  Plaintiffs do not always seek monetary damages as relief.  A preliminary 
injunction is a remedy that temporarily restrains activity until there has been a trial on the 
merits.
33
  A plaintiff may request a preliminary injunction to “guard against a change in 
conditions” which may prevent the granting of proper relief.34  This guard functions as a 
way to preserve “the status quo,” as well as require someone to act through affirmative 
                                                 
28
 Id.  
29
 FED. R. CIV. P. 65. 
30
 See Wright, supra note 21 at § 2941. 
31
 Muscato, supra note 2 at 657. 
32
 See Wright, supra note 21 at § 2947. 
33
 Id. 
34
 U.S. v. Adler’s Creamery, Inc., 107 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1939). 
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preliminary injunctions, and “is to be issued only upon showing that there would 
otherwise be danger of irreparable injury.”35   
Rule 65 governs every injunction and restraining order, including preliminary 
injunctions.
36
  However, the final decision whether to grant or deny a preliminary 
injunction rests in the discretion of the court.  While each court retains discretion, most 
courts discuss or examine some or all of the four most important factors in deciding 
whether to grant or deny an injunction: 
a. the movant’s likelihood of success; 
b. the likelihood that movant will suffer irreparable injury if the request for preliminary 
injunction is denied; 
c. the balance of hardships between the parties coupled against hardship faced by non-
parties; and 
d. the effect of grant or denial of preliminary injunctive relief on public policy.37  
The courts of appeals employ different formulations of these four factors when 
determining whether to grant or deny injunctions.
 38
   
 A movant’s likelihood of success, focuses on the probability that the movant will 
ultimately succeed on the merits.
39
  “If the trial court determines the movant is not likely 
to ultimately succeed on the merits, preliminary injunctive relief generally will be 
                                                 
35
 Id.  
36
 FED. R. CIV. P. 65. 
37
 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.22(1)(a) (3d. ed. 1999). 
38
 See Wright, supra note 21 at § 2947 (“The circumstances in which a preliminary injunction may be 
granted are not prescribed by the Federal Rules. As a result, the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction 
remains a matter for the trial court’s discretion, which is exercised in conformity with historical federal 
practice.”). 
39
 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE  § 65.22(2) (3d. ed. 1999) 
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denied.”40  There are several variations of this test, ranging from a “reasonable certainty” 
that the plaintiff will ultimately succeed on the merits to a “strong likelihood.”41   
Courts generally consider the irreparable injury to be the most important 
prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
42
  Irreparable harm is harm for 
which a court could not compensate a “movant should the movant prevail in the final 
decree.”43  In the past, courts balanced this factor with the movant’s likelihood of 
success, and the level of harm needed by the movant varied.  Some circuits held that a 
movant had to show a “possibility “ of harm, while others required that irreparable harm 
be “likely” if the injunction were not granted.44 
Courts also balance the hardship to the parties when considering whether to deny 
or grant a preliminary injunction.
45
  Courts will compare the severity of the impact on 
both the plaintiff and the defendant in determining whether to grant the injunction.
46
  
Courts determine hardship by considering “if the hardship experienced by the movant, if 
the injunction were denied, would outweigh the hardship experienced by the non-movant, 
if the injunction were granted.”47  Courts will likely deny a request for a preliminary 
injunction if the non-movant may experience hardship if the injunction were granted that 
outweighs the hardship of the movant, if the injunction were denied.
48
  Thus, courts 
balance the effects of injunctions on both movants and non-movants and will grant 
                                                 
40
 Id. 
41
 See Wright, supra note 21 at § 2948.3. 
42
 Id. at § 2948.1. 
43
 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE  § 65.22(1)(a) (3d. ed. 1999). 
44
See Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 375. 
45
 See Wright, supra note 21 at § 2948.2. 
46
 Hughes Network Sys., Inc. v. Interdigital Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 1994). 
47
 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE  § 65.22(1)(e) (3d. ed. 1999). 
48
 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE  § 65.22(1)(e) (3d. ed. 1999). 
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preliminary injunctions in favor of movants only if the denial of the injunction would 
cause the movant to experience greater irreparable harm. 
Lastly, courts discuss the effect of injunctive relief on public policy when 
rendering a decision.
49
  Courts often emphasize whether the public interest is furthered or 
if it is injured by the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction.
50
  “In exercising their 
sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public 
consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.”51  In Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower 
courts’ decisions to grant a preliminary injunction stating that the lower courts 
“significantly understated the burden the preliminary injunction would impose on the 
Navy’s ability to conduct realistic training exercises, and the injunction’s consequent 
adverse impact on the public interest in national defense.”52  Thus, the consideration of 
public interest is pertinent in considering whether to grant or deny injunctive relief.
53
  
 
IV. DIFFERING STANDARDS AMONG FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS 
 Each court of appeals employs the four general factors when determining whether 
to grant or deny a preliminary injunction; however, each court varies in its articulation of 
these factors.  The circuit courts fall into distinct groups based on the standard each 
employs for determining whether to grant or deny preliminary injunctive relief.  The 
majority of the circuits (the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, 
                                                 
49
 Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 376. 
50
 See Wright, supra note 21 at § 2948.4. 
51
 Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 376-77 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982)). 
52
 Id. at 377. 
53
 Amoco Production Co v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); see also 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE  § 65.22(1)(e) (3d. ed. 1999) (“. . . the public interest may be a predominant 
factor, even in the preliminary injunction determination in an action between private parties, if the matter is 
found to have a substantial impact on the public interest.”). 
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D.C. and Federal courts) utilize some variation of the traditional four-part test when 
considering preliminary injunctions.
54
  The Second and the Ninth Circuits employ a two-
part test that focuses on balancing factors that courts find most important; this two part 
test combines the four factors and does not weigh each one separately as seen in the 
traditional four part test.
55
  The Seventh Circuit “uses a sliding-scale method in which a 
five-part test is implemented.”56   
A. Traditional Four Part Test 
The traditional four-part test generally requires a movant to satisfy certain criteria 
before a court will grant an injunction.  The required criteria are: “(1) that plaintiff will 
suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) that such injury outweighs 
any harm which granting injunctive relief would inflict on the defendant; (3) that plaintiff 
has exhibited a likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) that the public interest will not 
be adversely affected by the granting of the injunction.”57  Although a majority of the 
courts of appeals uses the traditional four-part test, virtually all of these courts employ 
varying forms of the test.
58
 
Some courts, such as those in the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, District of 
Columbia and Federal, require strict adherence to the traditional four part test.
59
  These 
                                                 
54
 Denlow, supra note 3 at 515. 
55
 Id.  
56
 Id.; see also Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 811 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Sitting as a 
court of equity, the court then weighs all these factors employing a sliding-scale approach.”). 
57
 Planned Parenthood v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting Women’s Community Health 
Ctr., Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 544 (D.Me. 1979); see also Al-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300, 303 
(D.C. Cir. 2001). 
58
 Muscato, supra note 2 at 665. 
59
 Denlow, supra note 3 at 515-16; see also 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 
65.22(5)(m) (3d. ed. 1999) (“In the Federal Circuit, procedural matters and substantive matters over which 
the court does not have exclusive jurisdiction are reviewed under the law of the circuit in which the district 
court is located . . . because of the unique nature of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction, two different 
standards may be applied in cases involving general federal jurisdiction as well as issues subject to the 
court’s exclusive jurisdiction.”). 
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courts weigh the four factors separately and require a strong showing for each factor.   
The Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits require district courts to apply their four-part test 
because “a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy [which] should only be 
granted if the movant has clearly carried the burden of persuasion on all four factors.”60  
The circuit courts consider all four factors and no factor alone “will tip the balance.”61  
The Tenth Circuit and the DC Circuit, however, merely require the presence of all four 
factors and do not require that each factor meet a threshold level.
62
  For example, the 
court in Koerpel v. Heckler stated that in situations where the plaintiff satisfied just three 
of the preliminary injunction requirements, it would apply a “modified version of the 
fourth requirement, the ‘substantial success on the merits’ test:”  
Where the movant prevails on the other factors this court has adopted the 
Second Circuit’s liberal definition of the ‘probability of success’ 
requirement: ‘To justify a temporary injunction it is not necessary that the 
plaintiff’s right to a final decision, after a trial, be absolutely certain, 
wholly without doubt; if the other elements are present (i.e., the balance of 
hardships tips decidedly toward plaintiff), it will ordinarily be enough that 
the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, 
difficult and doubtful as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus 
for more deliberate investigation.
63
  
 
Five of the courts of appeals emphasize specific factors.  The First Circuit’s 
preliminary injunction test required that the plaintiff meet four criteria: “(1) that plaintiff 
will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) that such injury 
                                                 
60
 Mississippi Power & Light v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). 
61
 Denlow, supra note 3 at 518. 
62
 See Star Fuel Marts, LLC v. Sam’s East, Inc. 362 F.3d 639, 652-653 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Lundgrin v. 
Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980) (These circuits do not require a conclusive showing of each 
factor, "[t]o justify a temporary injunction it is not necessary that the plaintiff's right to a final decision, 
after a trial, be absolutely certain, wholly without doubt; if the other elements are present (i.e., the balance 
of hardships tips decidedly toward plaintiff), it will ordinarily be enough that the plaintiff has raised 
questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful as to make them a fair ground 
for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation.”)); see also Federal Lands Legal Consortium v. 
US, 195 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Cityfed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d 
738, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1995) . 
63
 Koerpel v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 858, 866 (10th Cir. 1986).  
 12 
outweighs any harm which granting injunctive relief would inflict on the defendant; (3) 
that plaintiff has exhibited a likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) that the public 
interest will not be adversely affected by the granting of the injunction.”64  Further, the 
First Circuit has held that “the heart of this test is the second and third steps, which 
present the question whether the harm caused plaintiff without the injunction, in light of 
the plaintiff’s likelihood of eventual success on the merits, outweighs the harm the 
injunction will cause defendant.”65  Here the First Circuit considered all factors but 
focused on the movant’s likelihood of success and the likelihood the movant will suffer 
irreparable injury if the request for preliminary injunction is denied in rendering its 
decision.   
Similarly in Latin American Music Company, Inc. v. Cardena Fernandez & 
Assoc., Inc., the First Circuit reiterated its tendency to focus on the plaintiff’s likelihood 
of success on the merits.
66
  The court vacated the lower court’s decision to deny 
injunctive relief based on the plaintiff’s failure to meet irreparable harm and remanded 
for further proceedings.
67
  The court stated that likelihood of success is “likely to be the 
key issue as to injunctive relief” and wanted the lower court to make an appropriate 
finding of all factors under FRCP 65.
68
 
The Third Circuit also considers and weighs the four factors utilized in the 
traditional four factor test, but emphasizes two factors: (1) the likelihood of success on 
                                                 
64
 Vargas-Figueroa v. Saldana, 826 F.2d 160, 162 (1st Cir. 1987). 
65
 Id. (citing Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 953 (1st Cir. 1983); SEC v. World Radio Mission, 544 
F.2d 535, 541 (1st Cir. 1976)). 
66
 Latin American Music Company, Inc. v. Cardenas Fernandez & Assoc., Inc., 2 Fed. Appx. 40 (1st Cir. 
2001). 
67
 Id. at 42. 
68
 Id. 
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the merits and (2) the probability of immediate and irreparable harm.
69
  The Third Circuit 
overturned a preliminary injunction in Campbell Soup Company v. Conagra Inc. because 
the movant was unable to show immediate and irreparable harm.
70
  The movant, 
Campbell Soup Company, requested a preliminary injunction to prevent its competitor, 
Conagra, Inc. from creating a non-fried frozen chicken product similar to one in 
production at Campbell Soup Company.
71
  The court when weighing all four factors 
places a special emphasis on irreparable harm by stating that a movant must “demonstrate 
potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or equitable remedy following a 
trial.”72  The court held the movant did not satisfy this burden because there was no 
evidence that immediate irreparable harm would occur without the injunction because 
Conagra was not close to marketing a non-fried frozen chicken product.
73
  The court 
overturned the preliminary injunction primarily because the movant did not satisfy its 
burden just on a showing of irreparable harm.   
Similarly the Fourth Circuit requires the movant to demonstrate the four 
traditional factors; equal weight is not placed on each factor.
74
  The Fourth Circuit stated 
in Hughes Network Sys. v. Interdigital Corp., that all four factors are considered; 
however, not all weighed equally.
75
  The court stated that “the ‘balance of hardships’ 
reached by comparing relevant harms to the plaintiff and defendant is the most important 
                                                 
69
 E.g., Campbell Soup v. Conagra, 977 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1992). 
70
 Campbell Soup, 977 F.2d 86. 
71
 Id.  
72
 Id. at 91-92 (“Establishing a risk of irreparable harm is not enough.  A plaintiff has the burden of proving 
a ‘clear showing of immediate irreparable injury.’  The ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be 
irreparable—not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in 
money cannot atone for it.’”). 
73
 Id. at 92. 
74
 E.g., Hughes Network Sys., 17 F.3d 691. 
75
 Id. at 693. 
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determination . . . .”76  The court ultimately remanded the case for further proceedings 
because the district court did not take a close enough look at the magnitude of harm to 
each party.
77
 
While the Sixth Circuit primarily has followed the traditional four part test, some 
of the court’s past decisions indicate a different approach, such as in Roth v. Bank of the 
Commonwealth.
78
  The court in Roth held that an appraisal of the traditional factors is 
necessary, but that a mechanical application of each standard is not an adequate test.
79
  
After this decision, the Sixth Circuit placed an emphasis on certain factors and employs a 
similar test as the First, Third and Fourth Circuits. 
B. Separate Two-Prong Tests 
The Second and Ninth Circuits utilize different variations of the standard for 
preliminary injunctions.  The Second Circuit implements a two-part alternative test.
80
  
This two part test requires that   “[a] party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish 
(1) irreparable harm and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) a 
sufficiently serious question going to the merits and a balance of hardships tipping 
decidedly in the moving party's favor.”81   
The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, before being reversed by the Supreme Court, 
required that a movant demonstrate either: “(1) a combination of probable success on the 
merits and the possibility of irreparable harm; or (2) that serious questions are raised and 
                                                 
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. at 695. 
78
 E.g., Mason County Med. Ass’n v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256, 261 (6th Cir. 1977); See Roth v. Bank of the 
Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527, 537-38 (6th Cir. 1978) (Plaintiffs requested an injunction to restrain the 
defendant bank from enforcing notes pledged by defendants as collateral for loans that were fraudulently 
obtained through an illicit financing scheme.). 
79
 Roth, 583 F.2d at 537. 
80
 Denlow, supra note 3 at 527. 
81
 Brennan’s Inc. v. Brennan’s Restaurant, L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson 
Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
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the balance of hardships tips in [the movant’s] favor.”82  This test appears similar to that 
of the Second Circuit; however, a movant in the Ninth Circuit could prevail by 
“demonstrating success on two alternative balancing tests, one involving probable 
success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm and the other involving a 
weighing of serious questions raised on the merits and the balance of hardships.”83  
C. The Sliding Scale Method 
The Seventh Circuit uses a “sliding scale method” when determining whether to 
grant or deny a preliminary injunction.  Under the sliding scale approach, the more likely 
the movant will succeed on the merits, the less the court requires the balance of harms to 
tip in the movant’s favor.84  However, if the plaintiff is less likely to win on the merits, 
the balance of harms must weigh more heavily in the plaintiff’s favor.  While the Seventh 
Circuit does consider the four factors,
85
 the court generally relies on the sliding scale 
method. 
 
V. PROPONENTS OF A UNIFORM STANDARD 
 As of yet, the Supreme Court has not expressly articulated one standard to be 
utilized by all the lower federal courts.  However, many proponents of a uniform standard 
urge the Supreme Court to articulate one standard for various different reasons.  
                                                 
82
 Sammartano v. First Judicial District Court, et. al. 303 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (The Ninth Circuit 
reversed the lower court’s decision to deny a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs demonstrated 
both probable success on the merits and irreparable harm.  The Plaintiffs were denied access to the Carson 
City, Nevada government building because they were wearing clothing bearing symbols of different 
motorcycle organizations.  The court stated that the plaintiffs were able to show a high probability of 
success on the merits that the rule by the Nevada government was discriminatory and that irreparable injury 
would occur because of their loss of First Amendment freedoms.  Due to the showing of both success on 
the merits and irreparable injury, the court did not have to address the balancing of hardships.). 
83
 Denlow, supra note 3 at 528. 
84
 Roland Mach Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, 
Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895-96 (7th Cir. 2001). 
85
 Libertarian Party v. Packard, 741 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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Proponents argue that having different standards and levels of burdens on movants in 
separate circuits does not serve justice.
86
  Discussion among proponents of a uniform 
standard have brought to life that “apart from a lack of uniformity the standards 
articulated are not precise rules and they are subject to case-by-case decision making – ‘a 
procedure that emphasizes the salience of particulars and hampers judges in discerning 
the systemic effects of the interpretive approaches they adopt.’”87   
Proponents also argue that these varying standards lead to inequitable decisions 
and cause the preliminary injunction tool to be commonly misunderstood.
88
  Scholars 
have argued that a more uniform standard should replace the current standard for 
considering preliminary injunctions or courts should simplify their standards.  Also, 
proponents of a more uniform standard argue that district courts apply the current 
standard inconsistently.
89
   
 One proponent of a uniform standard is U.S. Magistrate Judge Martin Denlow.  In 
his article, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal 
Standard, Denlow argues that courts should develop a uniform standard and suggested 
this standard focus on efficiency.
90
  He also proposes a stricter standard for granting 
preliminary injunctions.
91
 
                                                 
86
 Muscato, supra note 2 at 667. 
87
 Id.  
88
 Denlow, supra note 3 at 531. 
89
 John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 566 (1978) (“A more 
serious defect is the lack of an articulated rational. As a result, the relationship between the elements of the 
standard remains obscure and the standard is subject to thoughtless and inconsistent application.”). 
90
Denlow, supra note 3; see also Morton Denlow, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS: LOOK BEFORE YOU LEAP, 
28 LIT. 8 (Summer, 2002) (“[A preliminary injunction] . . . has limited utility because the standards for 
obtaining an injunction are unclear; the decision to grant or deny the injunction involves a number of 
issues, unrelated to the merits of the dispute; and a motion for a preliminary injunction creates the 
possibility of two rounds of discovery, two sets of trials, and two appeals . . . . Whenever possible, courts 
and parties should avoid motions for a preliminary injunction and proceed directly to a trial on the 
merits.”). 
91
 Id.  
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 Denlow’s standard sets forth three factors.  Denlow’s first factor requires that the 
movant explain to the court why a preliminary injunction is necessary instead of 
proceeding to a trial on the merits.
92
  Denlow argues that courts should actively 
discourage preliminary injunctions and should encourage parties to proceed to trial by 
asking “what is the critical component of the case that requires the grant of the injunction 
between the time the preliminary injunction can be decided and the time an actual trial on 
the merits can take place that cannot be satisfied by proceeding to a trial on the merits?”93  
He argues that if there is no immediacy to prevent a situation that may become 
irremediable before a trial, “the parties and the court will be better served with a trial on 
the merits instead of a duplicitous hearing on the preliminary injunction followed by a 
trial on the merits.”94 
 The second factor, which Denlow argues is the most important, requires movants 
to demonstrate at least a 50% chance of success on the merits.
95
  According to Denlow, 
this factor is intended to dissuade those parties who do not have a strong case from 
seeking a preliminary injunction when permanent relief would not necessarily be 
available to them if their case proceeded to a trial on the merits.
96
  Lastly, he suggests that 
“a preliminary injunction should not be entered unless the harm to the movant is greater 
than the harm to the nonmoving party taking into account possible bonds by either 
side.”97   Based on these factors, Denlow argues that adopting a sliding scale method, a 
two-part test, or a four-part balancing test manipulates the judicial process and wastes 
                                                 
92
 Id. at 537 (“First, the litigant must explain what aspect of their case requires that an injunction be granted 
instead of proceeding to a trial on the merits.  Second, the litigant must show that there is irreparable harm 
and that there is not an adequate remedy without the preliminary injunction.”). 
93
 Id. at 537.  
94
 Id. 
95
 Id.  
96
 Denlow, supra note 3 at 537. 
97
 Id. 
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valuable court time because these tests allow a movant to succeed on a motion for a 
preliminary injunction with a lower chance of success on the merits because there is a 
strong showing of irreparable harm.
98
 
 Denlow proposes a uniform standard because parties face confusion when 
confronted with determining what standard should apply for granting or denying a 
preliminary injunction motion.
99
  He argues that a uniform standard would remedy the 
discord present among the circuits due to the differing applications of the substantive four 
factors.  Denlow states that the lack of a uniform standard has caused inconsistent 
judgments and inequitable decisions.
100
 
 Denlow refers to two Seventh Circuit cases to demonstrate how differing 
standards can cause inconsistent judgments.
101
  The Seventh Circuit in Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Natural Answers, Inc., affirmed a preliminary injunction to prevent the use of the name 
“HERBROZAC” on herbal dietary supplements.102  Conversely, in Barbecue Marx, Inc. 
v. Ogdent, Inc., the Seventh Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction enjoining the use 
of the name “BONE DADDY” for a forthcoming restaurant because it was too similar to 
the movant’s “SMOKE DADDY” restaurant.103  In those cases, the two movants were 
required to establish two different standards for the likelihood of success on the merits 
factor.
104
   
                                                 
98
 Id.  
99
 Id. at 497. 
100
 Id. 
101
 Id. at 531; See also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000) and Barbecue 
Marx, Inc. v. 551 Ogden, Inc., 235 F. 3d 1041 (7th Cir. 2000). 
102
 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F. 3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000). 
103
 Barbecue Marx, Inc. v. 551 Ogden, Inc., 235 F. 3d 1041 (7th Cir. 2000). 
104
 Denlow, supra note 3 at 531 (“In order to succeed in Eli Lilly, the plaintiff was required to establish ‘a 
likelihood of success on the merits.’ Conversely, in Barbecue Marx the plaintiff was required to show only 
‘a greater than negligible chance of prevailing on the merits’ to meet the reasonable likelihood of success 
standard . . .  it is unmistakable that ‘a likelihood of success on the merits’ standard and ‘a greater than 
 19 
 As a magistrate judge, Denlow grounds his reasons for a uniform standard in his 
concern for administrative efficiency in courts.  His concerns for a routine application of 
one standard, so as to promote efficiency in the court system, and limiting the judge’s 
discretion are contrary to the essence of the preliminary injunction and its label as being 
an extraordinary remedy.  The Supreme Court has not yet stated any need for a uniform 
standard, but the Supreme Court has recently expounded on its standard for injunctive 
relief.
105
  This recent decision by the Supreme Court paves the way for a uniform 
standard which may address some of the concerns voiced by the proponents of a uniform 
standard; however, the court does not discuss any of the concerns set forth by Judge 
Denlow. 
 
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON THE PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION STANDARD. 
The Supreme Court has had several opportunities to discuss the applicable 
standards of granting or denying preliminary injunctive relief in the federal system.  
However, the Court has not expressly addressed the issue of differing standards amongst 
the circuit courts.  The Court commented on the purpose of preliminary injunctive relief 
in University of Texas v. Camenisch: 
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the 
relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.  
Given this limited purpose, and given the haste that is often necessary if 
those positions are to be preserved, a preliminary injunction is customarily 
granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is 
less complete than in a trial on the merits.  A party thus is not required to 
prove his case in full at a preliminary-injunction hearing and the findings 
                                                                                                                                                 
negligible chance of prevailing on the merits’ standard are not the same, thereby creating widespread 
confusion and potentially leading to inconsistent results depending on the panel. This confusion is 
multiplied when one looks at the variety of standards that exist among the circuits.”). 
105
 Winter, 129 S.Ct. 265. 
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of fact and conclusions of law made by a court granting a preliminary 
injunction are not binding at trial on the merits.
106
 
 
The Supreme Court continued to acknowledge the flexibility of the preliminary 
injunction standard. 
 In Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, “the Supreme Court 
circumscribed modern federal equity jurisdiction by holding that a district court has no 
authority to issue a preliminary injunction restraining a debtor’s assets in order to protect 
an anticipated money judgment since such relief was not traditionally granted by 
equity.”107  The Court considered the issue of “whether, in an action for money damages, 
a United States District Court has the power to issue a preliminary injunction preventing 
the defendant from transferring assets in which no lien or equitable interest is 
claimed.”108  The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision to preliminarily 
enjoin the holding company from transferring certain assets prior to final judgment.
109
   
The majority opinion referenced the traditional notion of equity and flexibility; however, 
stated that the injunction granted by the District Court did not meet the standards of a 
preliminary injunction.
110
   
                                                 
106
 University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 394-95 (1981). 
107
 Muscato, supra note 2 at 661 (discussing recent Supreme Court decisions that have given the Court the 
opportunity to discuss the applicable standards for the use of preliminary injunctive relief); Grupo 
Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308 (1999). 
108
 Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, 527 U.S. at 310. 
109
 Id.  (Scalia stated in the opinion that the equitable powers conferred on the American federal legal 
system did no include a power to create remedies that had been previously unknown to the courts of equity: 
“Equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High Court of 
Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original 
Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . the equitable powers conferred by they Judiciary Act of 1789 did not include the 
power to create remedies previously unknown to equity jurisprudence.”). 
110
 Id. 
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 On November 12, 2008 the Supreme Court announced its decision in Winter v. 
Natural Defense Council.
111
  This case concerned the United States Navy’s usage of a 
certain type of sonar during anti-submarine warfare training.
112
  The movants argued that 
the use of this sonar was detrimental to the health of the marine mammals living off the 
coast of Southern California.
113
  The movants sought declaratory and injunctive relief on 
the grounds that these training exercises violated the National Environmental Policy Act 
of 1969, the Endangered Species Act of 1973, and the Coastal Zone Management Act of 
1972.
114
   
 The District Court granted the movants’ motion for injunctive relief and 
prohibited the Navy from using MFA sonar during the anti-submarine warfare training 
exercises.
115
  “The court held that plaintiffs had ‘demonstrated a probability of success’ 
on their claims [and] . . . also determined that equitable relief was appropriate because, 
under Ninth Circuit precedent, plaintiffs had established at least a ‘possibility’ of 
irreparable harm to the environment.”116  The Navy appealed the district court’s 
injunction, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court’s decision 
that an injunction was necessary.
117
  However, the appellate court concluded that “a 
blanket injunction prohibiting the Navy from using MFA sonar . . . was overbroad” and 
remanded the case to the District court to narrow the injunction “so as to provide 
mitigation conditions under which the Navy may conduct its training exercises.”118  On 
                                                 
111
 Winter, 129 S.Ct. 265. 
112
 Id. 
113
 Id. 
114
 Id. at 372. 
115
 Id. 
116
 Id. at 372-73. 
117
 Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 373. 
118
 Id. 
 22 
remand, the district court enforced mitigation measures to be implemented by the Navy; 
however the Navy sought relief from the Executive Branch.
119
 
 The Council on Environmental Quality determined that the injunction set forth by 
the district court created an unreasonable risk because the Navy will not be able to 
properly train and certify a fully capable mission.
120
  Based on these findings, the Navy 
again moved to vacate the district court’s injunction; however, the district court refused 
to do so and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision again.121  The Ninth 
Circuit held that the plaintiffs established a likelihood of success on the merits and also 
determined that they “carried their burden of establishing a ‘possibility’ of irreparable 
injury.”122 
 On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s second 
decision to affirm and vacated the preliminary injunction.  The Supreme Court first set 
forth the four factors a movant must establish when seeking a preliminary injunction.
123
  
The Supreme Court did not agree with the standard used by the district court and the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s standard for 
irreparable harm.  “The district court and the Ninth Circuit also held that when a plaintiff 
demonstrates a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits, a preliminary injunction 
may be entered based only on a ‘possibility’ of irreparable harm . . . [w]e agree with the 
                                                 
119
 Id. at 373 (“The Navy then sought relief from the Executive Branch.  The President, pursuant to 16 
U.S.C. §1456(c)(1)(B), granted the Navy an exemption from the CZMA.  Section 1456(c)(1)(B) permits 
such exemptions if the activity in question is ‘in the paramount interest of the United States.’  The President 
determined that continuation of the exercises as limited by the Navy was ‘essential to national security.’  
He concluded that compliance with the District Court’s injunction would ‘undermine the Navy’s ability to 
conduct realistic training exercises that are necessary to ensure the combat effectiveness of . . . strike 
groups.’”). 
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 Id. 
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 Id. at 374. 
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 Id.  
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 Id. (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the 
merits, the he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”). 
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Navy that the Ninth Circuit’s ‘possibility’ standard is too lenient.”124  The standard the 
Supreme Court requires is stricter; a movant must demonstrate that irreparable injury is 
likely and not just a possibility.
125
  The Court stated that “issuing a preliminary injunction 
based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our characterization of 
injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”126 
 The Court continued by stating that injunctive relief is not proper because any 
irreparable injury the plaintiffs may have shown is outweighed by the public interest and 
Navy’s interest in “realistic training of its sailors.”127  The Navy argued that the 
injunction will hinder training efforts and ultimately leave strike groups vulnerable to 
enemy submarine warfare, thus reducing national defense.
128
  The Court stated the overall 
public interest weighed significantly in favor of the Navy.
129
 
 The Supreme Court concluded that “the District Court and Ninth Circuit 
significantly understated the burden the preliminary injunction would impose on the 
Navy” and the injunction would have an adverse impact on the public interest in the 
country’s national defense.130  The Court reversed the injunctive relief affirmed by the 
court of appeals and vacated the preliminary injunction to the extent challenged by the 
Navy.
131
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 Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 375. 
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VII. HOW MAY THE WINTER DECISION AFFECT THE STANDARD UTILIZED BY THE 
LOWER FEDERAL COURTS TODAY AND IS THIS A STEP TOWARD A MORE UNIFORM 
STANDARD. 
  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Winter may have far-reaching effects beyond its 
environmental impact.  This decision “affects every federal case in which a preliminary 
injunction is requested.”132  The Court reiterated the four factors that a plaintiff must 
show when seeking a preliminary injunction, but tightened the standard compared to the 
standard utilized by the Ninth Circuit.   
 The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s formulation of the standard, in 
which a plaintiff only had to show a possibility of irreparable harm if able to show a 
strong likelihood of success on the merits.
133
  The Court stated that this standard was “too 
lenient” and “inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an 
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is 
entitled to such relief.”134  Thus, the court tightened the standard by stating that the denial 
of the injunction must make irreparable harm likely to the plaintiff.
135
    
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Winter leans towards a clear showing of all four 
factors.
136
  The circuits that relied on a sliding scale test, “the higher the likelihood of 
success, the less irreparable harm need be proved, so when success looks like a sure 
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 Robert A. Brundage, Frank M. Hinman & David B. Salmons, Supreme Court Tightens Preliminary 
Injunction Standard, Nov. 18, 2008, http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MediaID=7817. 
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Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982)); (“A 
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is 
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favor, and than an injunction is in the public interest.”). 
 25 
thing, sometimes only the possibility of irreparable harm will suffice,”137 may have to 
adopt a new formulation of the standard; however, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent states that 
as of yet the Court has not expressly rejected the sliding scale method.   
In Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion, she states that she does not believe that the 
majority opinion rejects the sliding scale formulation.
138
  Ginsburg reminds the court that 
one of the most important characteristics of equity is flexibility.
139
  She emphasizes the 
flexibility of equity by stating that courts in the past have not required that a movant 
“show a particular, predetermined quantum of probable success or injury before awarding 
equitable relief.”140  Thus, in keeping with the essential characteristic of equity, Ginsburg 
denies that the majority opinion rejects the use of a sliding scale formulation.  The 
majority opinion does not make it clear whether it is or is not rejecting the sliding scale 
formulation; the answer is left to the lower federal courts in interpreting the Winter 
decision.  Thus, the Winter decision may only help to harmonize the circuit courts on the 
issue of the appropriate standard for a preliminary injunction, but has not expressly set 
forth one standard. 
A. Lower Federal Courts’ Interpretation of the Supreme Court’s Decision in 
Winter. 
 Recently, several lower federal courts have interpreted the Winter decision as 
setting forth a new standard for injunctive relief.  District courts in the First, Second, 
Fourth, Ninth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits, have all interpreted the standard set forth in 
                                                 
137
 Likely to Be Confused – The Softer Side of IP Law, Supreme Court Decision Clarifying Preliminary 
Injunction Standards, http://secondarymeaning.blogspot.com/2008/11/supreme-court-decision-
clarifying.html (November 12, 2008, 15:20 EST). 
138
 Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 392 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (“This Court has never rejected that formulation, and I 
do not believe it does so today.”). 
139
 Id. at 391. 
140
 Id. at 392. 
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Winter.
141
  Thus, the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision may include raising 
the threshold level needed for all four factors to receive injunctive relief by requiring that 
irreparable harm and success on the merits be likely, and not just a possibility, and the 
possible disappearance of the sliding scale formulation because of the need for a clear 
showing of all four factors. 
 The United States District Court for the District of Maine discussed the recent 
Winter decision in Animal Welfare Institute v. Martin.
142
  In its discussion of irreparable 
harm, the court interpreted the Winter decision and concluded that “the correct test for 
irreparable injury is whether the [movants] have demonstrated irreparable injury is likely 
if the injunction is not granted.”143  The court also stated that it “does not agree, 
particularly following Winter, that if [movants] demonstrate the other prongs for 
injunctive relief, the [movants] are relieved from demonstrating irreparable injury.”144   
 Maine is in the First Circuit.  The recent decision in Animal Welfare Institute 
discussed the previous standard used by the First Circuit.  The court acknowledged the 
heightened standard used in Lanier Professional Services., Inc. v. Ricci; the court in 
Lanier used the language of “a significant risk of irreparable harm.”145  However, the 
court also acknowledged that the First Circuit did “not carry forward Lanier’s precise 
                                                 
141
 See generally Animal Welfare Inst. v. Martin, 588 F.Supp.2d. 70 (D. Me. Nov. 26, 2008), Newmarkets 
Partners LLC v. Oppenheim, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99808 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2008), Quesenberry v. 
Volvo Group North America, 2009 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 22468 (W.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2009), Signature Flight 
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 Animal Welfare, 588 F.Supp.2d 70. 
143
 Id. at 102. 
144
 Id.  
145
 Id. at 101 (quoting Lanier Professional Services., Inc. v. Ricci, 192 F.3d 1,3 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
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wording”146 and the irreparable injury test used predominantly by the First Circuit was 
“the potential for irreparable harm if injunction is denied.”147  This test utilized by the 
First Circuit required only a potential for harm, while the court in Winter required harm 
be likely.  Thus, the court in Animal Welfare Institute interpreted Winter as changing the 
standard in the First Circuit.  It adopted the that “a movant must ‘demonstrate that 
irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction,”148 consistent with Winter, as 
the “correct test” for granting injunctive relief.149 
 Idaho is in the Ninth Circuit, in which the Winter decision originated.  The United 
States District Court for the District of Idaho discussed the change of the preliminary 
injunction standard in the Ninth Circuit in Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Timchak.
150
  
The Ninth Circuit strays from the traditional four part test and follows its own formulated 
two part test.  However, the Supreme Court criticized one aspect of the Ninth Circuit’s 
test.  The District Court stated in its opinion that “the Supreme Court . . . criticized the 
portion of the Ninth Circuit’s standard that allows the preliminary injunction to be 
entered based only on the ‘possibility’ of irreparable harm . . . judicial prudence would 
dictate . . . to require that a plaintiff demonstrate that irreparable harm is likely rather than 
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 Id. at 101-102. 
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 Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that the 
standard was lower than the standard used in Lanier Professional Services, Inc. by referring to a First 
Circuit decision where “the court was satisfied that the possibility of irreparable damage . . . was very faint” 
(citing Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1991))). 
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 Id.  
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Greater Yellowstone Coal, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96674 at *16 - *17 (“. . . a preliminary injunction is 
appropriate when the party seeking the injunction demonstrates ‘either (1) a likelihood of success on the 
merits and the possibility of irreparable injury; or (2) that serious questions going to the merits were raised 
and the balance of hardships tips sharply in [the plaintiff’s] favor.’”). 
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a mere possibility.”151  Thus, a district court in the Ninth Circuit has modified the 
standard previously used based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter.  
 The Fourth Circuit adopted the revised standard in W. VA. Ass’n of Club Owners 
& Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave.
152
  The Fourth Circuit had always employed the a 
hardship balancing test set forth in Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilif Mfg. Co.. 
153
  
Following Blackwelder, the courts in the Fourth Circuit considered factors set forth by 
the Blackwelder court in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction: “(1) the 
likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is denied; (2) 
the likelihood of harm to the defendant if the preliminary injunction is granted; (3) the 
likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.”154 
However, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter, the court employed a revised 
standard and adopted the Supreme Court’s standard for further use.155  The revised 
standard condenses the “hardship balancing test” previously used by the Fourth Circuit 
into the Supreme Court’s third factor.156  Thus, the Fourth Circuit applied the revised 
standard set forth by the Winter court and addressed the heightened irreparable harm 
burden by condensing the hardship test previously applied.   
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 Id. at *28. 
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Also, lower courts in the Fourth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision 
by requiring that a plaintiff show that success on the merits was likely instead of showing 
success on the merits was a probability.
157
  The court in Quesenberry v. Volvo Group 
North America stated “ it appears that under standards set forth in Winter and employed 
in Musgrave, the plaintiff must, at the very least, show that success on the merits is more 
likely than not.”158  In the past, the courts in the Fourth Circuit required only a probability 
of success on the merits to establish a likelihood of success on the merits.
159
  If this 
revised standard set forth in Quesenberry is followed, it would establish a burden of 
persuasion on two factors and not just on the irreparable harm factor set forth in Winter.   
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
“The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor 
to do equity and mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.  
Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.”160 
 
 The circumstances to which each factor of the preliminary injunction test should 
be applied were never prescribed by the Rule and thus, left the courts to determine their 
application.
161
  “Because of its discretionary character, an injunction decree typically is 
drafted in flexible terms, can be molded to meet the needs of each case, and may be 
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modified if circumstances change after it is issued or in the event that it fails to achieve 
its objectives.”162  The preliminary injunction was deemed an extraordinary remedy 
because of its discretionary character.  No single factor was determinative as to whether 
equitable relief was appropriate or not, a balancing was required and not a mechanical 
application of a laid out test.
163
   
The different applications of these factors cause many to urge the Supreme Court 
to articulate one standard for granting injunctive relief.  Among this group is U.S. 
Magistrate Judge Martin Denlow.  Denlow’s argument for one standard does not take into 
consideration the characteristics of injunctive relief and only focuses on efficiency.
164
  
Denlow briefly discussed the concerns raised by other proponents, but his argument 
focuses on the additional expenses and delay created by motions for preliminary 
injunctions.
165
  Arguments for one standard should be more concerned with inconsistent 
judgments, forum shopping and inequitable decisions.  When each court is able to apply a 
different standard or require differing levels of burden on the plaintiff, inconsistent 
judgments may occur and this does not serve justice.   
Originally, equity essentially was a system of a single chancellor making 
decisions according to his conscience; therefore there was no need for a single, uniform 
standard.  However, in today’s larger federal system it is harder to have such a system.  
One chancellor is not making the same decisions continuously, but many “chancellors” 
                                                 
162
 See Wright, supra note 21 at § 2942; see Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (“The essence of 
equity jurisdiction has been to mold each injunction decree to fit the necessities of each case.”). 
163
 Roth, 583 F.2d at 537 (“To those who might claim that there is an inconsistency in the standards 
employed by this circuit in its various decisions reviewing the exercise of the trial court’s preliminary 
injunctive powers, we believe that the following quotation by the trial judge . . . is most appropriate: ‘This 
apparent disparity in the wording of the standard merely reflects the circumstance that no single factor is 
determinative as to the appropriateness of equitable relief.”). 
164
 Denlow, supra note 3. 
165
 Muscato, supra note 2. 
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are making decisions and some are not consistent.  Therefore, the application of the 
factors continues to vary throughout the judicial system.    
However, post-Winter, lower federal courts have heightened the burden of 
showing irreparable harm based on the Supreme Court’s decision.166  The court stated 
that one circuit was “too lenient” in its standard, thus applying the test incorrectly.167  By 
heightening the Ninth Circuit’s standard, the Supreme Court is reiterating the 
extraordinary characterization of this remedy by making it more difficult for a movant to 
obtain a preliminary injunction and limiting judges’ broad discretion. 
The Supreme Court may realize that the differing standards in each circuit may 
lead to inconsistent judgments and inequitable remedies; however, the Court seems 
reluctant to expressly articulate one standard.  The Court may be reluctant to articulate 
one standard due to the characterization of equity as flexible, as evidenced by Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion.168  Despite this reluctance, lower federal courts have 
altered their standards after interpreting the Winter decision.  Thus, in a way, the Winter 
decision has indirectly lessened the flexibility of the preliminary injunction standard. 
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 See generally Animal Welfare Inst. V. Martin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97765 (D. Me. Nov. 26, 2008), 
Newmarkets Partners LLC v. Oppenheim, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99808 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2008), 
Quesenberry v. Volvo Group North America, 2009 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 22468 (W.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2009),  
Signature Flight Support Corp. v. Landow Aviation Ltd. P’ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2541 (E.D. Va. 
Loc. Adm. R. (a)(3) Jan. 14, 2009), Greater Yellowstone Coal. V. Timchak, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96674 
(D. Idaho R. 1.1(a) Nov. 26, 2008), UFW v. Chao, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2702 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2009). 
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 Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 375. 
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 Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 392 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
